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Abstract—The rapid technological convergence between Inter-
net of Things (IoT), Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs)
and cloud computing have contributed to the emergence of e-
healthcare, significantly improving the quality of medical care.
In particular, patient-centric health monitoring plays a vital role
in e-healthcare service, involving a set of important operations
ranging from medical data collection and aggregation, data
transmission and segregation, to data analytics. This survey
paper firstly presents an architectural framework to describe
the entire monitoring life cycle and highlight the essential service
components. More detailed discussions are then devoted to data
collection at patient side, which we argue that it serves as
fundamental basis in achieving robust, efficient, and secure health
monitoring. Subsequently, a profound discussion of the security
threats targeting eHealth monitoring systems is presented, and
the major limitations of the existing solutions are highlighted.
Finally, a set of design challenges is particularly analyzed for
developing high quality and secure patient-centric monitoring
schemes, along with some potential solutions.
Keywords: Wireless Body Area Networks, eHealthcare,
Cyber Physical Systems, Mobile Crowd Sensing, Security,
Privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent advances in wireless sensing technology have led
to the emergence of a wide range of applications in different
domains such as medical, sports, consumer electronics, social
networking, and enterprise usage. eHealth is recognized as
the most important and promising among these applications
due to its potential for health monitoring of chronic illnesses,
lifesaving in emergency situations, and its ability to provide
round the clock healthcare to rural and disadvantaged areas.
Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) are the key enabler
of remote and in-hospital health monitoring and are expected
to revolutionize the health and real-time body monitoring
industry. However, WBANs technology alone is not sufficient
to achieve the ultimate goal of eHealthcare stakeholders,
and other advanced technologies such as Internet of Things
(IoT) and cloud computing are needed to further improve the
eHealth monitoring system efficiency.
Thanks to the advancements of Internet of Things, machine-
to-machine (M2M) communications are enabled and getting
pervasively available. Meanwhile, cloud computing offers
plenty of opportunities to services providers and users, sig-
nificantly facilitating computation or storage outsourcing. As
one of the results of such technological convergence, medical
area has profited from recent advances in sensors design
and wireless communication technologies. In particular, the
constant miniaturization of electrical devices has empowered
the development of e-health monitoring. These include vari-
ous types of medical and non-medical sensors embedded in
smartphones, wearable devices in, on or around the patients
bodies, working as important elements of wireless body area
networks, or WBAN in short. Despite the recent technological
advancements of WBANs, as well as their great potential to
improve the quality of health monitoring, the performance
with respect to energy efficiency, privacy and security is not
sufficiently guaranteed.
Recent years have witnessed a fast development of smart-
phones sensors, body sensors and wireless communications,
which pave a way for efficient health monitoring. The health
care tasks are therefore shifted from traditional clinical en-
vironment to pervasive user friendly environment. Also, the
range of monitoring subjects could be significantly expanded,
varying from the patients at urgent care, e.g., in ambulance,
to those with chronic diseases. In particular, the body sensors
deployed in, on or around the human body, as well as the
context-aware sensors like the ones embedded in smartphones,
can be used to measure the fundamental health parameters
or vital signs such as heartbeat, temperature, blood pressure.
Moreover, other IoT sensors deployed in smart homes or at
hospital rooms might provide additional valuable information
about the environment where the monitored patient is located,
such as the temperature, the level of humidity, the lighting
as well as the level of patients sweat which can be measured
by advanced smart beds etc., allowing the medical stuff to
achieve more accurate diagnosis and thus deliver more efficient
treatment.
For better illustration, an overall eHealth monitoring frame-
work is given in Figure 1, which contains the following major
components,
• Situational awareness sensors: ranging from implantable
devices and wearable sensors to IoT sensors or smart-
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Figure 1: CPS Architecture for eHealth Monitoring
phone sensors, collecting data of interest from the patient
and transmitting them to the base station (also called
personal servers or gateways for different illustrations
purpose);
• Communication networks: these include short range wire-
less communications of WBAN (inter-WBAN communi-
cations), WBAN-IoT communications, IoT-IoT commu-
nications, as well as various relaying networks (connect-
ing base station with cloud servers) and access networks
(enabling clinicians to remotely access data servers) like
3G and wireline networks.
• Medical data processing servers: the data is usually
stored and processed in remote cloud data centers, which
must ensure secure and privacy-preserving computation
and storage. In addition, advanced data analytics tools
might be applied to derive useful knowledge from the
stored data, which can be further leveraged for different
purposes.
• Clinic terminals: the end users could be nurses, doctors
or any other physicians, who will retrieve the medical
information from cloud data centers via various access
equipment that could be deployed in hospitals, clinics,
ambulances or any medical care centers.
It is clear that the quality of eHealthcare service relies on the
seamless integration of the above essential components, each
of which is attracting tremendous efforts from both academia
and industry. For example, WBAN IEEE standard has been
released in 2012 [31]. In addition to wireless communications
technologies, energy efficiency and patient privacy are always
among the top concerns of eHealthcare services. Based on
the contributions from different relevant research fields, this
paper intends to investigate the key challenges for achieving
reliable, efficient and secure patient monitoring, which we
argue that it deserves more efforts than it currently receives.
We specifically examine a variety of solutions tackling those
identified challenges and ultimately propose the potential inte-
grations of those multidisciplinary approaches for constructing
a holistic eHealtcare-oriented, patient-centric, Cyber-Physical
System (CPS) framework.
In the rest of this paper, we will firstly discuss in detail the
major service components in Section II, with main focus on
WBANs and crowd sensing. An illustration of potential appli-
cations of the proposed monitoring framework is presented in
Section III, followed by a description of the tradeoff between
performance goals and security of the eHealth Monitoring
System in Section IV. Next, security and privacy requirements
for designing such a system are described, and a taxonomy
of the security threats targeting it along with the existing
solutions are discussed, in Sections V and VI, respectively.
A set of technical challenges for designing efficient and
secure patient monitoring framework is then investigated in
Section VII, highlighting the tradeoff between energy effi-
ciency and security issues. In Section VIII, we then study the
potential approaches to tackling those identified challenges,
and examine their feasibility and effectiveness in terms of the
key metrics that are essential to the quality and security of
eHealthcare monitoring.
II. A PATIENT-CENTRIC CPS-BASED EHEALTH
MONITORING FRAMEWORK
As shown in Figure 1, the CPS-based eHealth monitoring
framework is composed of four service components enabled
by diverse technologies, as well as three key players.
• Patients equipped with wearable devices forming Wire-
less Body Area Networks (WBANs), smartphone sensors,
as well as IoT sensors including both physically dis-
tributed sensors and software sensors or virtual sensors.
For example, both iPhone 5 and Samsung Galaxy S4 are
equipped with multifunctional sensors, as shows in Figure
2.
• Medical service providers whose role is to facilitate the
access of clinicians to different medical datasets in the
clouds.
• Clinicians using PDAs, laptops, desktop, smartphones,
or even dedicated medical devices to access, display
and manipulate the stored datasets if such privilege is
permitted.
From a functional perspective, the given architecture can be
treated as a typical implementation of CPS (Cyber Physical
Systems), which consists of physical layers and cyber (or ser-
vice) layers, well connected by the most advanced networking
and wireless communications technologies.
• Physical layer: this layer encompasses WBANs and IoT
sensors, cloud data centers, as well as those equipment
and devices used by medical staff.
Page 2 of 13
www.chinacommunications.cn
China Communications
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Figure 2: Smartphone sensors
• Service layer: the dedicated applications, software and
services enabled by physical layer and offered to both
patients and clinicians, as well as other interested third
parties, such as healthcare related research institutions.
Between the layers are wireless communication networks
ranging from LTE-A, NFC, WiFi,3G to high-speed wired
networks, conveying the medical data from patient side to
clinician side, and vice versa, particularly if an adjust-
ment/actuation of the monitoring devices operating parameters
or the patients environmental conditions are ne ded (e.g.
reducing the heat level in a hospital room due to the detected
high sweating level of the patient). It is worth noting that such
CPS framework can be carried and deployed at home, in work-
places, as well as in hospitals, thereby making eHealthchare
service pervasively available. However, in this paper, our effort
will be dedicated to patient-centric data collection, and we will
be specifically discussing WBANs for individual patients and
crowd sensing for massive disease monitoring and control.
A. WBANs in eHealth monitoring
Usually a WBAN encompasses a number of various sen-
sors, either implanted in the patients body, on or around
the body, together with IoT sensors sensing environmental or
contextual information [8]. Those heterogeneous sensors are
then integrated through a controller, which creates a link with
personal server/smartphone which, in turn, transmits medical
data to the cloud either periodically or on demand (i.e. event-
driven transmissions). In particular, the Personal Server (PS)
application which can run on PDA, smartphone, or home
personal computer, is primarily in charge of medical data
collection and aggregation, and serves as an interface between
WBAN sensors, end users, and other data servers. The PS can
also configure and manage WBANs, including sensor nodes
registration and initialization (e.g., specify sampling frequency
and mode of operation), tasks specification and allocation
(e.g., communication channel sharing, time synchronization,
scheduling), as well as setting up secure communication
channels between the sensors.
Moreover, the PS should be able to assess the patient’s
health status based on the information periodically collected
from the multiple medical sensors, and further detects any
abnormal change that may occur. Furthermore, it should be
able to apply the required actuation suggested by the medical
staff or learnt from knowledge base stored in the cloud. As pre-
viously mentioned, PS must establish a secure communication
link between WBANs and IoT sensors and medical servers
located in the cloud, updating patient information remotely.
One concern here is that such a communication link is not
always available, so PS is expected to exploit Delay Tolerant
Networking (DTN) capabilities, locally stores the data and
conduct updates as soon as a communication channel becomes
available.
A typical example for illustrating the application of WBANs
is emergency care. If a patient who has a heart disease
needs an urgent evacuation to the hospital while he is outside
for shopping, those implanted or wearable sensors can help
to measure the vital signs or physiological signals such as
blood pressure, temperature, and heartbeats, and send the
corresponding data via personal server to the service center
which, in turn, forwards it to the medical staff. As such, the
patient’s health status can be remotely monitored in real-time,
even when he/she is on the ambulance, allowing the doctors
to make timely diagnose, and prepare any required tool for the
necessary medical intervention/treatment in advance.
B. Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) in eHealth Monitoring
In addition to individual patient monitoring, observing epi-
demics at a large scale for efficient diseases prevention and
control is also an important function to be accomplished by
eHealth monitoring. As one of the novel sensing paradigms re-
cently emerged, mobile crowd sensing or participatory sensing
allows ordinary users to contribute their personal data for cen-
tralized information gathering and intelligence extraction [11].
Despite those technical challenges in crowd sensing, it has
potential to aid doctors or medical researchers in collecting
useful data for epidemic studies, so as to further understand
the infection and propagation of unknown diseases. To better
understand how MCS can be applied to eHealth monitoring,
Figure 3 is used to illustrate the basic procedures,
• The infected populations send medical reports, which are
collected by WBANs or any other sensors, to the cloud-
hosting medical servers.
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Figure 3: MCS for epidemic study
• Cloud service providers (CSP), either independently or
collectively, conduct centralized medical data analytics.
• Clinicians or medical researchers query the medical
records of interest for further analysis or studies.
It is well recognized that accurate patients tracking and pre-
diction of disease propagation are long-standing challenges in
medical research domain, especially due to the highly dynamic
migration thanks to modern transportation. We envision that
the proposed MCS-based disease control and prevention could
offer a novel alternative to enable effective eHealth monitoring
at a large scale, although some technical challenges must
be tackled for particular implementations. Among the many
foreseen advantages of MCS in eHealthcare early recognition
of disease symptoms is the most important one, as it enables
better control and understanding of diseases evolution, leading
to more accurate intervention and ultimately achieving either
timely treatment or propagation prevention.
III. ILLUSTRATION THROUGH REAL LIFE EXAMPLES OF
EHEALTH MONITORING APPLICATIONS
In this section, we present a few examples of eHealth
monitoring applications inspired from our daily life; this will
give a clear picture of the proposed system in this paper. For
example, lets assume that one of the users of our proposed
eHealthcare system has family history of heart disease. So,
heart specialists have suggested him to get an internal heart
monitor sensor implanted into his arm. This sensor is powered
by his/her bodys own thermal energy and constantly monitors
his/her heart rhythm, and is able to detect even the smallest
arrhythmias (i.e. a condition under which the heart beats with
an irregular or abnormal rhythm). In case of any alarming
changes, the sensor sends a text message to the patients
smartphone, saying: This is your heart, Please rush to the
nearest hospital immediately.
Similarly, another example of the same patient with different
scenario of the daily routine. We can easily elaborate the
idea of the healthcare monitoring application from a simple
example. Lets assume that different patients and doctors are
registered in a service providers infrastructure which is located
somewhere in cloud. Suppose that different patients enjoying
their everyday life either in their homes or in markets where
third generation (3G) communication system and WiFi access
points (free access either provided by city government or
telephone service provider) are easily accessible. Situational
awareness sensors send medical data via their personal servers
either periodically or sporadically. Since, our proposed eHealth
monitoring system also efficiently handles emergencies cases
of the already registered patients. If one of the patients
suffering from a heart disease needs emergency evacuation
to the hospital during his shopping, then we can imagine
the following two scenarios: (1) Assuming that all sensors
installed inside, on and around the patient monitor blood pres-
sure, temperature, and heart beat etc., and send the readings
to the cloud, and the (2), In this scenario, we assume that the
patient can manually calculate readings of his heartbeat, blood
pressure, temperature etc., through software sensor installed
in his/her smartphone and send them to the cloud. Upon
receiving such alarming medical data of this particular patient,
the service provider will immediately pass this data to a
particular doctor and ambulance service center. Moreover, the
service provider can communicate with the doctor or hospital
staffs through personal mobile phone to avoid further delay.
Within very short time, the patient will receive emergency
services and will be shifted to the hospital. Note that in
this scenario, reports sent by the patient may contain his/her
location information through GPS sensor of the smart phone
(Information about the location is compulsory for a patient
who is at high risk of heart attack etc.).
We, now, describe another application scenario which re-
spects the security and privacy needs of the proposed eHealth
monitoring system. Suppose Alice faces heart attack during her
shopping in a market which is far away from her home as well
as from the hospital. At first, emergency service person reads
Alices implanted RFID tag to retrieve her personal and medical
data from the already established WBAN network. Afterwards,
various healthcare personals can directly access the measure-
ments of her vital signs in real time manner. For instance,
a nurse inquires on Alices health status from her WBAN and
uploads an electronic report to the local server. Alices personal
server or smart-phone which works as personal digital assistant
(PDA) is already configured with an initial access policy (AP)
that can access her medical data. This predefined access policy
will give a fine grained access to Alices medical data in this
emergency case. It should be noted that the access policy in the
emergency case should be lenient in order to provide the best
medical services to the patient (Alice). This defined Access
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policy does not grant to the medical staffs any access to other
health information (i.e. information about other diseases that
Alice suffers from) not related to this specific emergency case.
For example, her sensitive HIV record is only allowed to be
accessed and shared with her particular specialist doctor. In
eHealth monitoring systems, medical data is often stored and
accessed distributively. During the heart attack, Alices WBAN
is constantly working to give fresh readings which are stored in
the sensor nodes. As soon as Alices ambulance reaches in the
wireless internet connectivity then Alices stored medical data
is transmitted to the local servers in order to avoid wastage
of the time by getting different vital signs readings before her
extensive medical diagnosis.
IV. PERFORMANCE GOALS AND SECURITY OF EHEALTH
MONITORING SYSTEMS
A long-standing problem for most of computer and commu-
nication systems is the tradeoff between performance goals
and security, while e-Health monitoring system is not an
exception. In order to understand the relations between them,
it is important to specify the metrics for both system utility
and security.
A. Utility metrics and performance analysis
In [14], a set of metrics have been identified for evaluating
safety and utility of implantable medical devices (IMDs), in-
cluding data accessibility or availability, data accuracy, device
identification, configurability, updatable software, multidevice
coordination, auditable, and resource efficient. Despite the
importance of those technical metrics in the design of IMDs,
we firmly believe that the specifications of utility metrics
should be derived from the practical needs of patients, clin-
icians, and other medical service providers, strictly comply-
ing with high-level requirements, regulatory, standards, and
laws. In particular, (1) from the perspective of clinicians,
an eHealth monitoring system must provide sufficient and
accurate medical information, aiding the clinicians in taking
most appropriate medical treatment to the patients; (2) from
the point of view of patients, the monitoring system should run
in extremely light-weight and unobtrusive way, collecting the
only necessary and useful data that allow them to be accurately
and timely treated. Formally, we define the following utility
metrics for eHealth monitoring systems,
• Usability. All the legitimate users involved in the moni-
toring process, especially patients and clinicians, should
be very easily interact with the system and perform
authorized operations, such as system initialization, con-
figuration, software or firmware update.
• Controllability. Data collection at patient side should be
fully under the consent of patients. One example is that
a patient under continuous health monitoring should be
granted the privilege to control what data can be collected
and who has access to what data. The controllability can
be delegated to the trusted third parties depending on
particular applications.
• Data quality. The medical data collected from the pa-
tient should be accurate and reliable, providing sufficient
information to clinicians for making correct treatments.
• Dependability. As a monitoring system is composed
of heterogeneous functional units, their operations and
interactions must strictly comply with control logics,
keep working correctly in presence of accidental device
errors or system faults such as device misconfigurations,
communication channel interferences, software bugs.
• Security. The medical data collected from patients must
be well protected from intentional attacks which may
target at both hardware and software vulnerabilities.
B. Security metrics and threat analysis
No fundamental difference with any other ICT services,
eHealth monitoring system must preserve confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability of patients’ medical data, as well as
their authenticity, accountability and non-repudiation in certain
circumstances. In addition, privacy of patients should be ap-
propriately preserved according to the specific application sce-
narios and particular patient requests. For example, the authors
of [32] have identified reliability, confidentiality, integrity,
availability, and privacy as trustworthiness requirements of
Personal Healthcare Systems (PHS). However, those coarse-
grained security properties can be hardly quantified and eval-
uated without insightful understanding on the utility metrics
of eHeath monitoring services, as discussed in Section IV-A.
In [14], the authors have proposed a set of essential security
and privacy requirements for IMDs, including authorization
(personal authorization, role-based authorization, IMD selec-
tion), IMD device availability, device software and settings,
device-specific privacy (including device-existence, device-
type, device-ID), measurement and log privacy, bearer privacy
(e.g., patients name, medical history, or detailed diagnoses),
and data integrity. Such a security analysis may present a
valuable reference for assessing eHealth monitoring services
in terms of desirable security metrics.
Revisiting the eHealth monitoring framework shown in
Figure 1, we specify the security metrics in the following
categories,
• Patient-centric static privacy. This may cover personal
information such as gender, name, social security number,
and so on. Those information are persistent and unique
to a patient and can by no means be duplicated.
• Patient-centric dynamic privacy. This type of information
may vary with patient’s health status, including medical
history, real-time collected medical data or physiological
information, which are collected by IMDs and WBANs.
• Patient-centric environmental privacy. This type of infor-
mation may contain geographic location and other IoT
sensor data, which can be used to identify the patient’s
current situation.
• Patient-device interactions. This requires that patient rel-
evant privacy should be well controlled and protected
(three types of privacy specified above), while the data
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collected from devices should be well accessed and
protected (availability, integrity and confidentiality).
• Device-device communications. This implies that the de-
vices must be mutually authenticated (authorization and
authenticity) in order to talk to each other via secure
communication channel (confidentiality).
• Beyond WBAN data delivery. The data collected from
IMDs and WBANs must be securely delivered to cloud
service providers for further processing, primarily includ-
ing computation and storage. A set of security require-
ments have been identified in [17], which falls out of the
scope of our paper.
To meet those security requirements and achieve the
corresponding security metrics, it is imperative to conduce
a comprehensive threat analysis, examining security
vulnerabilities and risks in eHealth monitoring systems.
Considering the intrinsic complexity and heterogeneity of
system components, our threat analysis will be conducted
from a cross-layer perspective, with particular focuses on
four aspects, i.e., hardware, software, communication, and
operation. Meanwhile, we assume the potential attackers to
be either active or passive, and they can be either individually
or collusively.
V. SECURITY AND PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS OF REAL LIFE
SCENARIOS
In order to develop robust security solutions for the eHealth
monitoring systems, it is very important to understand the
fundamental security and privacy requirements of such sys-
tems. These two terms can be defined as follows: data security
means that the data is securely stored and communicated to
other entities/peers, whereas data privacy means that the data is
accessed and used only by the authorized persons. Therefore,
developing eHealth monitoring systems with the highest level
of security and privacy preservation guarantees is the ultimate
objective of all the stakeholders investing in healthcare do-
main. In the following, we will discuss the essential security
and privacy requirements in healthcare systems, by classifying
them into three main categories: Administrative level security,
Network level Security, Physical level security and Information
level security, as shown in Figure 4.
A. Administrative level security
As discussed in the previous sections, privileges granting
and access control rules must be well defined, context aware
and adaptive to accommodate the required patients’ health
data availability and access flexibility properties, especially
in emergency conditions.
• Data Access Control: data access control is a privacy pre-
serving tool aiming to prevent any unauthorized access to
the patient’s personal and health data. In healthcare sys-
tems, the patient’s medical data can be accessed by mul-
tiple stakeholders such as, doctors, nurses, researchers,
health ministry as well as insurance companies1 etc.,
leading to an increasing risk of misusing such sensitive
information. Therefore, role based access control model
[17] is needed to enforce different access privileges for
different participants. For example, doctors and nurses
may have different access privileges to the patient’s
health record according to their responsibilities, while
insurance companies might be allowed to access only
the information related to the reimbursements of medical
bills. Moreover, several access authorization levels should
be granted to the doctors based on their role with regard
to the patient’s treatment; i.e. the doctor responsible for
the patient’s health status will have full access to his/her
health information, while other doctors may have limited
and adaptive access privileges depending on the context
and circumstances.
• Accountability: applying the accountability mechanism
[47] in eHealth monitoring systems aims to achieve more
appropriate and efficient usage of the patient’s health
information by the legitimate users, and prevent any
potential misuse that may threaten the patient privacy.
Thus, by knowing that such mechanism is implemented
by the system, any attempt to violate the granted access
authorizations or to transfer the accessed data to an
unwanted third party should be discouraged.
• Revocability: revocability consists in protecting a given
system from compromised entities and users. If an entity
or user is deemed to be malicious or compromised,
then all the granted privileges should be immediately
cancelled; e.g., in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
context, a certificate issued to a given user can be revoked
if the certificates encryption keys are compromised or the
encryption device is stolen. Therefore, the main purpose
of the revocability mechanism is to prevent any harm
that might be caused to the system as a consequence of
the detected security breach (i.e. malicious behavior or
compromised entity).
It is worth-mentioning also that Administrative level
security should include robust authentication measures and
regular audit of all involved administration entities. This will
certainly prevent eavesdropping threats which are among
the main reasons that may cause the failure of eHealthcare
monitoring systems.
B. Network level security
The network security plays a major role in ensuring the
security of the whole eHealth monitoring system since it
provides safe transmission of the data from the sensing devices
towards the remote data servers, and from these latter to the
end user such as clinicians. Network security encompasses
also securing the network devices against tampering attacks.
1Usually, insurance companies can have very limited access, if not no access
at all, to the patient’s sensitive health information since they may refuse to
issue/renew his/her insurance contract if they know that he/she has a chronic
or a critical disease for example etc.
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Figure 4: Main security and privacy preservation requirements in eHealth Monitoring Systems
In what follows we present the key security features that need
to be ensured at this level.
• Data Confidentiality: data confidentiality means that the
exchanged data through the network is properly protected
from any type of man-in-the-middle attack which violates
the data privacy and leads to the disclosure of personal
health data to unwanted users. The components of the
eHealth monitoring systems transmit very sensitive in-
formation about the patients who usually do not accept
sharing it with others, as it reveals their health conditions
(e.g. Diabetic, drug-addicted, early stage of pregnancy
etc.). To protect the users privacy, all communications in
healthcare systems should be encrypted. Data encryption
in traditional sensors is usually achieved by encrypting
the information before sending it, using a secret key
shared on a secure communication channel established
between the communicating entities. In case of inter
device communications, the more appropriate way for
encryption is the use of stream cipher algorithms, since in
such algorithms the size of ciphertext is exactly the same
as plaintext, and no extra data needs to be transmitted.
• Non-repudiation: non-repudiation property guarantees
that the sender of a data cannot deny that he/she has not
transmitted it. Similarly, the receiver of this data cannot
deny its reception from that particular sender. Generally,
digital signature is the most widely used tool to ensure
the non-repudiation.
C. Physical level security
Security efforts at physical level are devoted to the protec-
tion of eHealth monitoring system from threats targeting the
physical sensor devices, in order to ensure the accuracy and
trustworthiness of the data they generate. Hence, threats like
sensor node capture and jamming attacks should be efficiently
mitigated.
• Resilience to Node Capture: two main types of physi-
cal sensors can be distinguished in eHealth monitoring
systems, namely, sensors placed on the patients body,
and the IoT sensors deployed in hospital premises or
embedded in some equipment such as the hospital smart
beds. The former type of sensors is responsible for mea-
suring the patients vital signs, while the latter measures
the environmental conditions. Without robust physical
level security mechanisms, attackers can easily capture a
particular sensor node, retrieve its cryptographic keys and
protocol state information, and finally clone it in order
to redeploy multiple malicious sensors in the network.
Such captured/compromised sensors can be placed into
the eHealth monitoring system, leading to devastating
impact on the whole system. This is a real challenge that
requires a lot of attention from the research community
to develop effective countermeasures [44].
• Resilience to Jamming Attack: although jamming attack
has been extensively studied in the literature and several
solutions have been designed to mitigate it, the specific
characteristics of the environment in which the sensors
are deployed in WBANs make it harder to detect and to
deal with. In eHealth monitoring systems, WBAN sensors
are often located within the transmission range of several
IoT devices with varying power resources and processing
capacities, which makes it easier for an attacker to target
a given WBAN sensor and isolate it by jamming any data
sent/destined from/to it.
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D. Information security
Security of the information is the backbone of any eHealth-
care monitoring system. Since eHealthcare applications in-
volve not only medical but also personal information, security
and privacy preservation of such information are key concerns
in this context. We outline below some key measures that can
protect the data from various threats.
• Data Encryption: appropriate light-weight data encryption
techniques can save data from the disclosure in the transit.
• Data Integrity: another important factor of the security
is the proper integrity check of the exchanged data to
prevent any modification of its content while in transit.
• Authentication: appropriate authentication schemes can
also make data more secure. It is an efficient measure to
avoid impersonation attacks.
• Freshness Protection: this security service prevents an
attacker from replaying outdated information. This attack
is particularly harmful in eHealthCare context since it
may lead to the spread of inaccurate/false readings about
patients vital signs, which in turn can mislead the clini-
cians in some critical decisions regarding this patient.
VI. SECURITY THREATS IN EHEALTH MONITORING
SYSTEMS: A TAXONOMY
In eHealthcare monitoring system, there are various po-
tential security threats that may significantly degrade the
overall system performance and its trustworthiness level. In
this section, we will limit our study to three major threat
sources through which all other threat classes can be launched.
These three sources are the patients themselves, insiders
(i.e. authorized users and medical staff), and outsiders (i.e.
unauthorized users), as described below.
• Identity threats: identity related threats can be launched
using two different approaches. On one hand, the pa-
tient may lose (or share) his/her identity information,
enabling adversaries to get access to his/her eHealth
account. On the other hand, insiders may use the patient
identities to disclose a particular data of interest to a
third party. This class of threats can result from one of
the following scenarios: First, Loss of the identity, in
which patients leave their login information on a pub-
lic computer. Second, identity sharing whereby patients
share passwords with outsiders (either intentionally or
accidentally). Third, through social-engineering attack,
causing passwords disclosure to outsiders. Last possible
threat is insurance fraud, in this type of threat the insiders
misuse patients identities to get insurance reimbursement
and obtain medical services.
• Access threats: (unauthorized access to eHealthcare data)
In this type of access, the victim patient or any other
legitimate user modification can give way to the unau-
thorized persons. This may happen due to the over-
privileges granted to certain users. There could be any
motive behind such act, for example, insurance fraud etc.
• Disclosure threats: unauthorized disclosure of medical
data in eHealthcare system. Disclosure threats can be
launched through any malware or file sharing tools and
even by intentional or accidental password sharing.
It is well known that the eHealth monitoring system is
vulnerable to several other threats mainly due to the inherited
vulnerabilities from wireless networks. Indeed, the wireless
channel, used as main communication support, is prone to
various types of security attacks ranging from eavesdropping,
data modification [39] and injection to jamming and Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks [30]. Therefore, the security threats
targeting this system can be also categorized according to the
vulnerability that the attacker exploits to conduct the threat.
First, threats as a consequence of the device compromise
such as identity loss and, second, threats due to the network
dynamics.
• Threats caused by device compromise: the tiny sensors
used in the eHealth monitoring system are less tamper-
resistant compared to other wireless devices and they can
easily be compromised. Even if data stored in sensor node
as well as on the local server is encrypted along with its
encryption key, compromising the device will certainly
lead to the disclosure of the data.
• Threats caused by the network dynamics: The eHealth
monitoring systems are highly dynamic in nature due
to their scalability from WBANs to the mobile crowd
sensing. Due to the accidental failure or malicious ac-
tivities, nodes can leave and join the network frequently.
Moreover, some nodes may die due to the exhaustion
of their battery power; therefore an attacker can launch
attacks by masquerading authentic dead nodes.
A. Existing solutions for the security threats: State of the Art
In this section, we present a detailed review of the existing
solutions to the already discussed threats. We have classified
these solutions into two major classes; secure data storage
related solutions, and data access related solutions.
Secure data storage related solutions: recently, Wang et
al. [35], have used erasure coding technique to securely store
medical data. Erasure coding is the method of data hiding in
which data is first coded, then broken into segments and stored
at several different locations. For example, original encrypted
data is broken into n data blocks using erasure coding, where
each data block contains its secret key. Then, those data
blocks are distributed to n neighbor nodes for storage. All the
sensor nodes, used for storing data, compute and broadcast an
algebraic signature for each data block so that the integrity
of the data can be verified. Signature size, computational and
storage overhead of this scheme have been shown to be low.
Consequently, this scheme can be considered as an appropriate
countermeasure against data modification threats.
Fine grained data access related solutions: in eHealth
monitoring systems, it is necessary to establish fine grained
distributed access control. Therefore, we will discuss below
the existing schemes aiming to ensure the security of both the
system and medical data
• Symmetric Key Cryptography (SKC) based schemes:
these schemes have proven an efficient way for distributed
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access control in eHealth monitoring systems. A solution
proposed by Morchon et al. [37], in which Blundos key
pre-distribution scheme is used to enable Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC). Polynomial keys shares are pre-
distributed, patients can easily establish pair wise key
with any authorized entity and encrypt that particular
data using this key. Mostly, SKC based schemes have few
flaws with respect to their usage in eHealth monitoring
systems, e.g., they have high key management complex-
ity, and are vulnerable to users collusions.
• Public Key Cryptography (PKC) based schemes:
Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) is one of the widely
used techniques to ensure fine grained access control
in sensor networks. ABE based scheme is one to many
encryption method in which cipher text is readable to
those group of users who satisfy certain access policy
primitives. Such schemes are proven to be robust against
collusive attacks, as in these schemes, colluding users
are not allowed to derive any key belonging to the other
users.
Due to the expressive nature of its access privileges,
this class of schemes seems to be promising solution
for the fine grained access control in eHealth monitoring
systems. In [40], the authors proposed Cipher text Policy
ABE (CP-ABE) that perfectly addresses the needs of the
role based access control. In this scheme, each user is
assigned a set of attributes (roles), and the patients give
permission to access their medical data to a particular set
of roles/users. Finally, access privileges (AP) is built and
which is used in the ciphertext. This scheme is based on
tree-like access policy which is more expressive.
As discussed in the Section V, accountability of the
assigned access privileges is mandatory in order to avoid
unauthorized access to the patients medical data. In [49],
Yu et al., have presented key abuse attack through ac-
countability of the access privileges and proposed a solu-
tion that uses the revocability of the access privileges. To
detect malicious activity of a pirate device, one frequently
used technique is to trick the malicious/pirate device
into decrypting tracing ciphertexts and If it succeeds
in decrypting it, this means it will provide evidence of
pirating [49]. Therefore, it is clear that for a honest
(unsuspected) user, it is difficult to correctly decrypt a
tracing ciphertext even if this latter contains its access
control attributes. Yu et al. have proposed a broadcast
based revocation scheme in WSNs [49], in which all
the key updates are done through one broadcast message
only.
• Anonymous Access Control: public key cryptography is
still vulnerable to infer privacy information from the ac-
cess policies. Therefore, some authors have used anony-
mous access control based schemes in order to safeguard
eHealth monitoring systems from unauthorized accesses.
Recently, Nishide et al. have proposed two constructions
of Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-
ABE) with a partially hidden access policy [51]. The
authors succeeded to present anonymity of recipient by
hiding subsets of the attributes specified in the access
privileges. In another work, Zhang et al. [52] proposed
an anonymous distributed access control scheme, which is
based on the tokens issued by the healthcare center before
accessing data in WBANs. In this work, blind signature
is used to achieve anonymity. It is believed that this work
has failed to achieve fine grained access control because
each anonymous user has the same access privileges.
Based on the herein discussed access control schemes, we
can conclude that Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) based
schemes are more promising for achieving fine grained access
control in eHealth monitoring systems.
B. Limitations of the existing solutions
A security mechanism is the process of securing a given
system from adversaries’ attacks. It should have the capability
to either prevent the attack, or detect it and trigger adequate
reaction. This is a quite difficult task particularly for eHealth-
care systems due to the limited processing power, storage,
and communication capabilities of sensor nodes. Therefore, we
will highlight the impact of such constraints on the efficiency
of the above described solutions.
• Limitations of cryptographic based solutions: due to the
above limitations of sensors, cryptographic techniques
are not suitable for eHealthcare systems since they are
either very expensive to run or may significantly reduce
the system efficiency. As eHealth monitoring systems
carry sensitive information and deal with emergency
situations, a failure to cope with efficiently with vary-
ing situations will certainly reduce the scope of the
particular eHealthcare system. Therefore, the deployed
cryptographic schemes should not affect the performance
goals of the eHealth monitoring system. Some people
argue that asymmetric cryptosystems are high-priced for
medical sensors and interchangeable crypto systems do
not seem to be versatile enough [41]. In general, there
are three types of key management protocols, namely,
trusty server, pre-distribution key management and self-
imposing key management. Key management protocol is
the basic step to construct any secure system. There are
various types of the cryptographic keys which are setup
and distributed to the nodes within the networks [42].
• Limitations related to routing protocols: the routing func-
tion plays a major role in ensuring secure end-to-end data
transmission in the network. However, due to the existing
flaws in some routing protocols, WSNs and WBANs are
exposed to several types of denial of service attacks, as
outlined in [46].
• Trust Management: trust establishment and management
among the sensor nodes and the data aggregator nodes
are essential for the proper functioning of eHealthcare
systems. It is a bond of mutual association among all
the devices of the eHealth monitoring system. In [45],
trust is defined as the degree to that a node ought to be
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trustworthy, secure, or reliable throughout any interaction
with the node, this shows that the trust is one of the key
pillars, if not the most important one, for the success of
eHealth monitoring systems.
• Secure Localization: providing proper location estimation
of the patients is necessary in eHealth monitoring systems
due to their relatively high mobility. Along with the
different health related readings of the patients, med-
ical sensors can also provide their locations. In [45],
Boukerche et al., have described localization algorithms
based on different geographical measurements, such as,
the distance, and angle estimation etc. The authors have
also highlighted different attacks targeting patients’ lo-
calization systems.
VII. DESIGN CHALLENGES: DEALING WITH THE
TENSIONS BETWEEN UTILITY AND SECURITY
Considering the objective of eHealth monitoring systems,
a set of high level performance metrics can be specified for
measuring the quality of performance goals. The major ones
may include usability, cost-efficiency, dependability, accuracy,
and security. This Section will discuss the design challenges
associated with those desirable properties, primarily usability,
security, and efficiency.
A. Usability: Patient-System interactions
It is well known that current eHealthcare systems lack of
friendly interfaces for both medical staff and patients [18],
which would be one of the major factors impeding their
wider acceptance in practice. For example, most of existing
healthcare systems require the patients to measure their own
vital signs and send them to the data center, but those
patients with chronic illness or in critical health conditions
are unable to accomplish this task properly. Thus, the eHealth
monitoring systems must provide highly automated equipment
and tools, significantly reducing the user’s involvement into
the deployment, operation, and management. In addition, as
patient-centric monitoring relies on the cooperation of multiple
heterogeneous sensors, ranging from implantable or wearable
sensors to smartphone and IoT sensors, their configurations
must be transparent to the patients, avoiding any confusing
or inconvenient settings. Despite non-trivial efforts from CHI
(Computer-Human Interaction) research domain, the unique
requirements on the design of user-friendly eHealth monitoring
systems raise a set of challenges.
B. Cost-efficient and quality data collection
To obtain real-time, reliable and accurate health status of the
monitored patients, the monitoring system must continuously
collect the data of interest for a long period. This implies
two requirements: first, medical data must be efficiently col-
lected and updated, saving communication and computation
overhead; second, the quality of data must be ensured, as
the noisy or even false/inaccurate data may lead to wrong
diagnose and further lead to human life risks. Clearly, there are
tradeoffs between the two requirements. On the one hand, the
cost resulting from data collection should be minimized, which
however will impact the quality of data. On the other hand,
in order to ensure the quality of data, the sensing coverage
and duration must be maximized, which then will increase the
cost and may affect the real-time availability of patients health
status related data for medical staff.
To date, we have seen lots of efforts devoted to energy
saving designs for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), ranging
from communication protocol designs like MAC and routing
to optimal sensor node deployments [1]. As a matter of
fact, most of sensors, either WBANs or IoT sensors, are
resource constrained and can hardly be rechargeable, espe-
cially implantable sensors, so the sensing algorithms and data
collection methods must be extremely efficient. While due to
the unique characteristics of WBANs, which usually relies on
short range wireless communications and the sensors are well
pre-distributed, most of energy efficient schemes for traditional
WSNs cannot be directly applied to WBANs. This therefore
calls for novel designs, ranging from power-saving sensor
hardware [32], [24] and light-weight routing algorithms to
optimal running of applications [2].
Another challenge is that those employed sensors may
collect and report false or noisy data due to unexpected hard-
ware failures, unpredicted operating environmental factors, and
unreliable communications issues. For example, as human
bodies always keep moving and exposed to electromagnetic
radiations, wireless communication would be error prone
due to channel interference and signal fading, and routing
paths may get unstable. In 1998, an experimental study has
shown that low-power heart monitors at a hospital could be
overwhelmed with electromagnetic interference, and become
unable of providing critical care readings when a nearby TV
station turns on a new digital television transmitter using a
previously vacant TV channel [22]. Consequently, inaccurate
or false data could be generated and collected, resulting in
wrong diagnosis and even loss of lives if inappropriate medical
intervention decisions were made. Meanwhile, as WBANs
sensors operate in, on, or around human body, the negative
consequences such as electromagnetic radiation and heats
should be carefully considered as well.
C. Secure and privacy-preserving data processing
Despite the promising utilities of eHealth monitoring ser-
vices, the patients would be reluctant to use them without
convincing security and privacy guarantees. As aforemen-
tioned, the intrinsic vulnerable nature of sensor technologies
and wireless communications allow malicious adversaries to
gain overwhelming advantages to launch various attacks at
patient side, and the attack targets could cover both hardware
and software, ranging from heat emissions, radio signals and
communication channels to different applications [25], [33].
First of all, data sensing and transmission may suffer from
jamming attacks because of the open communications chan-
nels. For example, Gollakota et al. showed that it is possible to
exploit the wireless connectivity between implantable medical
devices (IMDs) so as to compromise the confidentiality of
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the transmitted data, finally leading to electric shock to the
patient [12]. Similarly, the sophisticated might be capable of
eavesdropping the communication links between near body
sensors and personal servers or gateways, and even injecting
forged data. For example, in [15] the authors reported several
software radio-based attacks that could compromise safety and
privacy of the patient wearing pacemakers and implantable
cardia defibrillators (ICD). It is even not surprising to observe
in the wild those attacks using simple power analysis or elec-
tromagnetic interference (EMI) to WBANs and other medical
devices [16]. Furthermore, due to the co-existence of several
WBANs in a small physical area, especially in hospitals, high
interferences are inevitable and may lead to similar conse-
quences as in the case of jamming attack. Therefore, accurately
identifying the reasons behind the observed high interface (i.e.
an attack or a normal situation) is a real challenge that deserves
careful consideration.
Secondly, as medical sensors or devices need to run software
for data collection and processing, the attackers may manage
to break in the monitoring system by exploiting particular
software vulnerabilities. In particular, Kevin Fu et al. pointed
out that even old malware can be used to compromise medical
device software [10], while malware tailed to WSNs and
smartphones have been commonly seen in recent years due to
the proliferation of mobile phone applications [29]. As eHealth
monitoring systems rely on IoT sensors and smartphones to
collect and relay the data especially for MCS based data
collection shown in Figure. 3, the infected software may open
the door to attackers and further make the whole monitoring
system compromised.
Last but not least, although we may assume that the patient
data can be securely transmitted to remote data centers thanks
to those sound security protocols like TLS, which unfortu-
nately suffers from various attacks as well, the patients’ data
can still be comprised by attacks in the cloud and clinician
side. These, however, are out of the scope of this paper, as we
are more concerned with patient side data collection.
VIII. MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES: FEASIBILITIES
AND EFFECTIVENESS
To tackle the identified challenges, the development of
potential solutions must carefully balance the tradeoff be-
tween the performance metrics of concern in order to achieve
the best quality of eHealth monitoring. In this Section, we
will selectively and comparatively study a set of candidate
approaches drawn from different research domains, with an
objective to examine the feasibility and effectiveness of those
existing schemes towards light-weight, reliable and secure
eHealth monitoring services. As we are particularly interested
in the tension between efficiency and security issues, our study
will be conducted from two perspectives,
• How the design of security mechanisms can be tailored to
eHealth monitoring systems by meeting with a majority,
if not all, of performance metrics. Further, the introduc-
tion of security mechanisms should not lead to negative
impacts on the performance goals.
• How the eHealth monitoring systems can be developed
with built-in security and privacy mechanisms, or how the
security and privacy by design approaches can be applied
to develop eHealth monitoring systems.
A. Light-weight security mechanisms for eHealth monitoring
The previous analysis indicate that due to the intrinsic com-
plexity and diversity of eHealth monitoring systems, the attack
surface is extremely broad, meanwhile novel vulnerabilities
and threats will be continuously introduced due to the dynamic
nature. Thus, an in-depth defense line composed of diverse
security mechanisms must be carefully leveraged to be inte-
grated with eHealth monitoring systems in a light-weight and
unobtrusive way. Here we will examine a number of available
security mechanisms tailored to eHealth monitoring systems,
which are intended to preserve authenticity, confidentiality,
and integrity of medical data collected from patients.
1) Collecting right data from right patient by right party:
As one of the major worries of patient is that some personal
information is exposed, the monitoring process should strictly
adopt no more no less principle. This implies that: first, the
data can be only collected by the well authenticated parties;
second, the data can be only collected when it is really needed;
more importantly, the patient should be given a privilege to
decide what data can be collected and who can collect that.
This privilege is assumed if the patient health status allows
him/her to make such a decision, whereas a default setting is
used in case of emergency.
Making hardware device trustworthy. As an eHealth moni-
toring system is composed of numerous sensors and medical
devices, all the involved systems must be trustworthy [9]. In
fact, nowadays TPM (Trusted Platform Modules) has gained
popularity for secure computation and communications of
hardware devices, and its application to medical devices has
been considered as well [13]. Another potential solution is
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [21], which may en-
ables a medical device to be efficiently and securely authen-
ticated based on the unique hardware attributes. However, the
generation of robust and perfect PUFs is still an open issue
in the community. Regarding medical devices authentication,
one body authentication problem was proposed in [6] for
addressing the concern that the wireless sensors in a WBAN
are collecting data about one individual and not several indi-
viduals. Despite the given solutions which are less efficient
than TPMs or PUFs, more studies are desired.
Patient-centric authentication schemes. In order to preserve
the privacy of patients, WBANs should be able to monitor the
patients anonymously. As the solution, J. Liu et al. proposed
a pair of certificateless remote anonymous authentication pro-
tocols [19], allowing patients to enjoy eHealth monitoring
service while keep their identities unknown. However, in
certain circumstances, some personal information such as
geographical location, blood type, disease record must be
known for better medical treatment. Upon the requests from
medical staff, the patient should be given privilege determining
to what extent his/her privacy information can be exposed. To
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address this issue, a patient self-controllable and multi-level
authentication scheme was proposed in [20], which allows the
patient to determine what type of data can be accessed by
different physicians.
2) Ensuring medical data to be well protected: To protect
medical data at rest or in transit, cryptography based tech-
niques such as data encryption and cryptographic protocols
are commonly used, which however may incur unwanted
cost burdens for eHealth monitoring system. For example,
the authors in [17] have discussed a set of cryptographic
primitives for achieving secure medical data storage and access
control, including SKC (Symmetric key Cryptography) and
PKC (Public Key Cryptography) based schemes. Generally,
such pubic key based schemes intend to protect the raw
physiological information by encrypting them using public
keys, which requires non-trivial computation and memory.
Although symmetric cryptosystems theoretically consume less
computational resource and communications overhead, the
generation and management of keys must be sufficiently
considered.
Alternatively, a straightforward yet efficient solution is to
secure inter-WBAN communications and medical data trans-
mission by exploiting the intrinsic characteristic of the human
body [23]. We classify those schemes as privacy by design
approaches, which will be discussed in the following Section.
B. Security or privacy by design
The ideal solution to simultaneously achieve efficiency and
security is security or privacy by design approaches [4].
In another word, security and privacy must be taken into
account from the scratch of data collection, avoiding any post-
processing with the purpose of enhancing security or privacy.
1) Biometric cryptography for inter-WBAN communica-
tions: Although different WBAN sensors play different roles
in data collection, e.g., optical sensors on the earlobe or toe for
measuring pulse rate, sensor on the wrist for measuring blood
pressure, electrodes on the chest for capturing electrocardio-
gram, microphone on the chest for capturing heart sounds,
the physiological information can be generally represented
as either electrocardiogram (ECG) or photoplethysmogram
(PPG), which then can be used by biometric cryptosystems
to generate the communication keys [23]. Compared with
classic encryption schemes, biometric encryption has potential
to improve security and reduce key management complex-
ity [26]. However, one significant issue is to select the most
appropriate biometric traits for generating the effective and
robust keys [3], while the key agreement and management are
also nontrivial [27].
Moreover, as WBANs usually use various frequency bands,
especially some low frequency bands which have not been
used in other similar wireless technologies. The propagation
wave is then more likely to diffract around the human body
rather than passing through it, and the path loss is higher
when the sensors are placed at different sides of the body [7],
[12], [18]. Therefore, leveraging these unique physical layer
characteristics and combining them with the above biometric-
based schemes will lead to significant improvement of security
as well as keys generation and management.
2) Advanced signal and Image processing: As the physi-
ological information is represented in signals and images, by
carefully taking into account security and privacy concerns,
the advanced signal and image processing techniques can
be applied or improved for eHealth monitoring services. For
example, compressive sensing has been widely recognized in
signal processing domain as an efficient technique for data ac-
quisition by exploiting the signal’s sparseness. In particular, it
has been successfully applied to biomedical image processing
like MRI, as well as biomedical sensing applications [5]. By
taking advantage of its intrinsic features, the authors of [28]
showed that compressive sensing can serve as a core technique
to achieve privacy-aware cloud-assisted healthcare monitoring
system. Thus, we believe the recent advances of signal or
image processing, together with novel sensor technologies and
sensing paradigms, would significantly benefit to improving
secure and efficient eHealth monitoring services.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper surveys state-of-the-art approaches to designing
efficient and secure eHealth monitoring. Specifically, we firstly
presented a comprehensive framework for advanced eHealth
monitoring system by describing, in detail, the entire monitor-
ing life cycle. We have also highlighted the essential service
components, with particular focus on data collection at patient
side. To ensure high efficiency of the proposed framework, we
have presented and analyzed the key challenges that need to be
solved in order to develop efficient and secure patient-centric
monitoring system. This concise survey paper is expected to
serve as the blueprint for our future work based on a better
understanding of the root causes leading to the failures of
existing security and privacy preservation schemes for eHealth
monitoring.
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